Account-generic design
Suggest an editApply the Irrelevance Principle to one property, the identity of the user. A system that does not care who is asking has no reason to remember anyone. Systems built this way, called account-generic, are safer and easier to build on than systems that keep a record of every user, as long as the job does not require remembering users.
Two services, one that remembers you and one that does not
An account-generic system holds no mapping from a user's identity to that user's stored state. Everything it needs to answer a request arrives with the request, and once the request is done, nothing about that particular caller is kept.
Take a currency conversion service. You send an amount and two currency codes, and it sends back the converted amount. It keeps no record of who asked, and the next caller gets an answer computed the same way. Your identity has no effect on what one hundred dollars is in euros, so by the Irrelevance Principle the design does not track it.
A bank's ledger is account-specific on purpose. The bank has to know how much each customer holds, and it has to keep knowing across every deposit and withdrawal, for years. A ledger that forgot who owned what would be broken, because the record of who owns what is the ledger itself.
Storing nothing per user gives an attacker less to corrupt
When a system keeps state for each user, that stored state becomes a target, because the state is what decides the outcome. An attacker inflates a stored balance, or slips through a check by pointing it at some other user's record. An account-generic system has no per-user state in storage, so attacks on the stored mapping have nothing to aim at.
What makes a system stateless extends this argument to everything a component keeps between calls. A stateless component keeps nothing at all, while an account-generic one drops the per-user record in particular.
Any caller can use it without registering
An account-generic service does not need to know in advance who will call it. There is no account to create first, so a new caller sends a well-formed request and gets a correct answer on the first try, the same as every existing caller. Anything that wants to build on top can do so without asking permission or being known ahead of time.
What an account-generic system cannot do
The price is every feature that needs a per-user record. A service that remembers no one cannot count one caller's requests against a limit, bill a caller for past use, or block a single caller, because each of those needs a record kept per caller.
Check what you store per user
You can classify a system with one question. For each user, what does it keep between calls? If the honest answer is nothing, and the results are still correct, the system is account-generic and should stay that way. If the answer is a balance, a history, or a claim that has to survive from one call to the next, the system is account-specific, and that is correct, because remembering the user is the job.
Neither style is better in the abstract. What decides is whether the purpose requires remembering users. When it does not, do not remember them.
Blockchain application
Some on-chain proxies are account-generic. Every call carries a complete, self-contained assertion, for example that after this transaction a given address must hold at least a certain amount of a certain token. Nothing is stored between one call and the next. Because the proxy remembers no users and grants no one standing rights, anyone can call it, which is what makes it permissionless. An ERC-4626 vault has to track each depositor's claim over time, so it is account-specific by necessity, the same way a bank ledger is.